Will There Be a New Definition of “Purchase Money”? by Bernhardt, Roger & Dyer, Stephen W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
7-2010
Will There Be a New Definition of “Purchase
Money”?
Roger Bernhardt
Golden Gate University School of Law, rbernhardt@ggu.edu
Stephen W. Dyer
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernhardt, Roger and Dyer, Stephen W., "Will There Be a New Definition of “Purchase Money”?" (2010). Publications. Paper 413.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/413
July 2010 
Will There Be a New Definition of “Purchase Money”? 
Roger Bernhardt and Stephen W. Dyer 
    On June 3, 2010, the California State Senate passed, by a 30–4 vote, SB 1178, sponsored by 
the California Association of Realtors (CAR). If the Assembly approves and the Governor signs 
this measure, SB 1178 will significantly modify CCP §580b, the purchase money antideficiency 
rule, which prohibits all sellers and some lenders from recovering any shortfall in a loan that 
was secured by the real property that the borrowers had purchased, and extends that protection 
to refinancings. While we are not certain, at the time of this writing, whether the bill will become 
law, we nevertheless offer these observations because this issue is likely to reemerge in the future 
even if the bill fails during the current legislative session. 
    CAR has urged that it is important to extend deficiency protection to a refinanced loan. CAR 
argues that: 
It is unfair to subject homeowners to new personal liability merely because they refinance the 
original mortgage..... The unfairness is particularly acute in that almost no borrowers understood 
the new liability that was being acquired along with the refinance. 
Although CAR’s position seems to be that purchase money loans should not lose their special 
nonrecourse character on refinancing, its main emotional appeal appears to be borrower 
ignorance of this consequence. While it certainly true that many borrowers did not understand 
that loss of deficiency protection was a consequence of refinancing, it is also true there was 
never any real certainty that this was, in fact, ever really the case. 
Some Background 
Code of Civil Procedure §580b generally prohibits the recovery of a deficiency judgment in a 
purchase-money transaction, but the rule is applied differently to vendors than to lenders. (In this 
column, we use the terms “vendor” and “seller” interchangeably.) A vendor of real property who 
has taken back a mortgage or deed of trust (or contract of sale) on the property conveyed as 
security for the purchaser’s promise to pay the balance of the purchase price is subject in all 
cases to CCP §580b, whereas a third party lender who has taken a mortgage or deed of trust to 
finance the acquisition of property is barred from deficiency recovery only if the property 
purchased is a dwelling consisting of 1–4 residential units, one of which is to be occupied by the 
purchaser. That distinction has been in §580b since 1963. 
Section 580b was enacted in 1933. In the 77 years of its existence, it has been the subject of 
some surprising decisions. In 1953, the California Supreme Court held, in Brown v Jensen 
(1953) 41 C2d 193, 259 P2d 425, that a vendor who had been sold out by virtue of a foreclosure 
sale by the senior lender was prohibited by the statute from suing the purchaser for a money 
judgment on her note because of its purchase money status, and that such relief would constitute, 
as a policy matter, pursuit of a deficiency judgment, even though she had never foreclosed on her 
deed of trust. 
Ten years later, in Roseleaf v Chierighino  (1963) 59 C2d 35, 27 CR 873, the court elaborated 
that, although a sold-out junior vendor was exempt from the one-action rule (CCP §726) and the 
other antideficiency statutes (the fair value rule of CCP §580a and the trustee sale bar of CCP 
§580d), because her security had been rendered worthless, the exception did not apply to §580b, 
leaving the sold-out junior vendor with no further available relief against her defaulting 
purchaser. 
Another distinction that the supreme court made in Roseleaf (and repeated nine years later in 
Spangler v Memel (1972) 7 C3d 603, 102 CR 807) was between the “standard” purchase money 
transaction—to which §580b applies automatically—and “variant” transactions in which its 
application depends upon whether §580b’s policies are perceived to apply. Currently, the 
policies of §580b are held to be those of deterring overvaluation and of stabilizing against 
depressions—although skeptics have never been able to discern how those policies actually 
accomplish their purposes, especially when third party lenders (who do not set selling prices) are 
involved. A foundational question that will need to be addressed under the new statutory 
definition of purchase money is whether refinancings are standard or variant transactions—and, 
if variant, just how the judicially perceived policies behind the statute are to be applied. 
The policies of §580b were first declared before the statute was amended in 1963 to include third 
party lenders, but Prunty v Bank of America (1974) 37 CA3d 430, 112 CR 370, held that a 
residential construction loan from a third party was nevertheless a purchase money loan, stating 
“the anti-deficiency protection of the amended statute is no longer limited to the narrow bounds 
of the ‘standard purchase money transaction’”—meaning that the lender could not recover a 
deficiency judgment even though the borrowers owned the residential lot before they obtained 
the construction funds. 
Finally, in 1999, the supreme court held, in DeBerard Props., Ltd. v Lim (1999) 20 C4th 659, 85 
CR2d 292, that a purchaser could not waive by contract his purchase money deficiency 
protection in exchange for new consideration during a workout with the seller, despite the fact 
that the purchaser had received significant benefits in the form of a reduced interest rate and 
lower monthly payments. 
Although one court of appeal has stated that a refinanced loan is thereafter not entitled to 
purchase money deficie ncy protection (Union Bank v Wendland (1976) 54 CA3d 393, 126 CR 
549), the force of that decision is uncertain in light of the supreme court’s later holding in 
DeBerard, as well as other decisions that have focused on different, and more policy-oriented 
rather than technical, considerations. See, e.g., Shepherd v Robinson (1981) 128 CA3d 615, 180 
CR 342; Lucky Invs., Inc. v Adams (1960) 183 CA2d 462, 7 CR 57; and Jackson v Taylor (1969) 
272 CA2d 1, 76 CR 891—all inventing various (and sometimes novel) policy reasons for 
concluding that a purchase money loan retained that character despite subsequent financial 
rearrangements. Even more remarkably, in LaForgia v Kolsky (1987) 196 CA3d 1103, 242 CR 
282, an originally nonpurchase money loan was held to have been converted into a purchase 
money obligation. This muddled background does not make predicting the effect of CAR’s new 
language an easy undertaking. 
Evolution of SB 1178 
When SB 1178 was first introduced, the bill provided that a loan used to pay part of the purchase 
price also included debt incurred to construct or substantially improve the real property—
language that would appear not only to endorse the Prunty doctrine but also to extend 
antideficiency protection to subsequent remodelings or additions to existing structures. An 
amendment added a sentence stating that the borrower had the burden of proof of demonstrating 
the portion of the subsequent loan that was used to acquire, construct, or substantially improve 
the real property. However, both of those features were eliminated by the time the Senate acted 
on June 3. The elimination of the construction and improvement language makes it no longer 
possible to say what impact this will have on Prunty. 
The version of SB 1178 that passed the State Senate on June 3 adds the following new paragraph 
to the statute: 
For purposes of this section, a loan used to pay all or part of the purchase price of real property 
or an estate for years shall include subsequent loans, mortgages, or deeds of trust that refinance 
or modify the original loan, but only to the extent that the subsequent loan was used to pay debt 
incurred to purchase the real property. 
SB 1178 also states that the law will become operative on June 1, 2011, and applies only to 
actions filed after its operative date. 
According to CAR, SB 1178 was amended to attract additional support because the measure 
failed to garner 21 votes when it first came up on the floor of the Senate. The legislative analysis 
listed numerous lending organizations, including the California Bankers Association, the 
California Mortgage Association, and the California Mortgage Bankers Association, as opposing 
the measure. 
As of the date this column went to press, the Assembly Judiciary Committee had reported the bill 
with a recommendation for approval. 
Potential Issues if SB 1178 Becomes Law 
Will lenders who had already made loans that refinanced purchase money mortgages on what 
they believed was a full recourse basis be able to attack this new definition of purchase money as 
impermissibly impairing their contractual rights? CAR clearly intended the bill to apply to 
refinancing loans already made. According to a news release on May 20, 2010, CAR “rejected 
proposed amendments to the bill from the lending industry that would restrict the legislation 
from applying to loans originated prior to 2011.” CAR’s president stated, “The people that really 
need protection are the folks who refinanced in 2005 and didn’t know its effect, not the folks 
who will get loans next year.” The bill will have little effect in this new era of tight money if it is 
held to apply only to future refinancings, but can be expected to generate great controversy if it is 
applied to refinancings that have already occurred. 
The Senate’s legislative analysis does not mention this point, although the Assembly’s analysis 
states that opponents of SB 1178 argue the bill “upsets [lenders’] expectations regarding existing 
loans” and that the measure “fundamentally alters and impairs the nature of [existing] loan 
contracts after consummation of the contract.” In that regard, Hales v Snowden (1937) 19 CA2d 
366, 65 P2d 847, and  Birkhofer v Krumm (1938) 27 CA2d 513, 81 P2d 609, declined to apply 
§580b protection to deeds of trust and mortgages that were created before §580b became 
effective, and Birkhofer and Drapeau v Smith (1939) 34 CA2d 84, 93 P2d 157, refused to apply 
fair value limitation to security instruments that predated that legislation. Although these 
decisions can constitute a powerful impediment to any retroactive definition of purchase money, 
the courts could conclude that the “new” statutory revision was, in fact, already included in the 
original definition—that purchase money remains purchase money even when a loan is 
technically restructured—for policy reasons similar to those given in the cases we have already 
mentioned. 
When a purchase money loan is increased, i.e., supplemented with nonpurchase money funds, 
how will bifurcation between purchase money and nonpurchase money work? The new language 
makes the subsequent funding purchase money only to the extent it paid off original purchase 
money debt, which means that most loan increases will not carry purchase money status. This 
generates many difficult questions. 
As loan payments pay down the new, larger loan, to which portion of it are they to be applied? 
Existing loan documents are no doubt silent on this unforeseen issue. Language in future loans 
would have to avoid being treated as impermissible attempts to waive §580b. 
If the initial principal amount of an original purchase money loan had been already paid down 
somewhat before the refinancing occurred, is the purchase money portion the full original 
amount or only the reduced amount that existed immediately before the refinance? Does this 
principle apply if numerous refinancings occurred over time? The new statutory language makes 
inconsistent singular and plural references to “subsequent loans,” but it is not hard to discern 
CAR’s desire to bring all refinancings within the §580b umbrella. On the other hand, each new 
refinancing is unlikely to increase the amount of funds carrying purchase money protection. 
When there is a foreclosure and sale, is the purchase money portion of the loan paid off before 
or after the nonpurchase money portion, or are they prorated? If the purchase money component 
is paid first, then deficiency liability could attach to the balance, rendering the protection slight 
indeed. Protection would be far more effective if the purchase money portion is paid last, 
although a deeply underwater property could still expose the borrower to deficiency liability. 
Because the statute gives no explicit assistance on this issue, courts might even consider some 
kind of prorating in these situations. 
Who has the burden of proving what amount of the funds was used for the original purchase? As 
noted, a sentence imposing that obligation on the borrower was removed from the bill. Although 
this might support an argument that the contrary effect was thereby intended, it is clearly easier 
for a borrower to trace its use of the borrowed funds. Stipulations in future loan documents may 
start to cover this point. 
The Senate’s legislative analysis stated that opponents of SB 1178 claimed the measure would 
“negatively impact” short sales, but it is hard to see why that should happen. By definition, the 
original loan would have had to have been purchase money (to come under the new provision), 
and no additional funding would arise (for the sale to be “short”). In such a situation, a new 
purchaser would not face any recourse exposure, even if he or she did not personally occupy the 
property and “assumed” the old loan, since there is nothing to assume in a loan that is already 
nonrecourse. Case v Egan (1922) 57 CA 453, 207 P 388. Nor would that former owner lose the 
protection she previously had, since DeBerard is likely to prohibit any kind of waiver in 
connection with the short sale. 
Real estate attorneys will be in for complicated and interesting times if this new definition of 
purchase money takes effect, especially since there is also pending in the Senate SB 931, 
which proposes to prohibit deficiencies on first deeds of trust and mortgages arising from 
short sales of 1- to 4-unit residential dwellings while preserving lenders’ claims for fraud 
and waste. 
